TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHINGTON SECTO 46

EYES ONLY

To: The President FROM SALINGER

CONTROL 458

Date: August 8, 1961

3.00 PM

1) On Monday, August 7, Humbert Bianchi, press spokesman for President Fanfani of Italy arrived in Paris with instructions to deliver personal message to me for the President and Secretary. Mr Fanfani felt the President should have this information as quickly as possible and decided to send Mr Bianchi so as not to attract attention to the mission. I met with Mr Bianchi for an hour this morning and the following is the substance of his message.

- 1) Mr Fanfani did not bring up the subject of Berlin with Mr Khrushchev but the latter did and it occupied the bulk of the two-way conversation. Mr Khrushchev stated that Germany was a key to peace and war and that the problem must be solved now. Mr Fanfani told Mr Khrushchev he could not discuss in detail possible settlements. He told Mr Khrushchev that any doubts about Western solidarity would be a grave miscalculation. Mr Khrushchev said that if war came over Berlin it would be a nuclear war from the beginning. He repeated this about twelve times during the talks. He kept saying that this was not a threat but that there was no other choice for him.
- 2) At one point Khrushchev drew a crude map and said to Fanfani that he did not want war but that naturally his military men had plans and were prepared for war should it come. He said the first two countries to be destroyed would be Italy and Great Britain, since they contain many missile bases with missiles aimed at the Soviet Union.
- 3) Khrushchev agreed that negotiations could be started. In his last talk with Khrushchev , Fanfani gathered that Khrushchev is seriously considering waiting until the end of the German election before taking any initiative on talks. However, he did not make any commitments on this matter. Khrushchev stated that military measures and counter-measures, statements and counter-statements, and highly publicized news and counter-news might make it impossible to start any negotiations. If negotiations do start, Khrushchev said that they cannot be allowed to go on for years or even for too many months. Khrushchev stated that the recognition of the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia is essential to the conclusion of any negotiations. He stressed the subject of two Germanys and deplored the fact that Macmillan and de Gaulle had told him privately that they do not want a reunited Germany but will not tell this to Adenauer or say it publicly.

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TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

4) Any discussion about a unified Germany should take place between the two Germanies but Khrushchev stressed again that no one in the West really wants the reunification of Germany. Khrushchev stated that Berlin should a free city, guaranteed by international instruments and protected by token troops. He said these could be four-power troops, including the Soviet Union, US troops or neutral Khrushchev stated that the alternative to multilateral negotiations is signing a peace treaty with East Germany. This treaty would include recognition of East Germany's right to control access to West Berlin and the treaty would state that Berlin is a free city. The Western powers should then negotiate with East Germany to get access to Berlin. Any attempt to force an access would be an aggression and provoke war the first day. The reaction would be nuclear war immediately. Any attempt to create an airlift would be considered an aggression also. Khrushchev stated that he is under heavy pressure from the scientific military complex to allow the construction of a new type of atomic weapon. weapons would be much more powerful and cheaper than present ones. He produced figures on these weapons and said a new bomb proposed by a scientist would be equal to 100 million megatons and would cost only two and one half times the cost of those of one million megatons. Khrushchev said he was resisting this pressure but could not do so indefinitely, especially when Western countries were publicly re-arming.

Opinions and Evaluations

Mr Bianchi offered the following opinions and evaluations of Fanfani:

- 1. It highly irritates Khrushchev to be made to look hesitant and afraid. He does not want to appear this way to either his military apparatus or his people. If he feels he is being made look this way, he will be forced into a military catastrophe.
- 2. As claims of military measures and armaments go on, they will reach a certain point where it will be impossible to stop. It will be impossible to retreat without losing face and all doors to negotiations will be closed. Khrushchev also stressed this point and Fanfani believed he was sincere.
- 3. Possibilities for negotiations still exist. Khrushchev referred to statements made by Senators Mansfield and Fullbright and said he thought President Kennedy agreed with these statements at least 80 percent. Khrushchev stated: "we are all of us, including Mr Kennedy prisoners of Mr Adenauer's policies".
- 4. These possibilities may be kept open. It would help if our decisions in the field of defense are taken cautiously and not too spectacularly or are publicized so that Soviet reactions in the race to conflict are avoided.
- 5. While following cautious ways, the West should not wait too long to announce its willingness to negotiate. The announcement to do so should be made publicly so that Khrushchev can resist the

TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

pressures of his military leaders.

- 6. Discreet and effective preparations should follow that announcement so that the West would be able to begin negotiations early and in better positions.
- 7. Surely the speeches which will be delivered in the Federal Republic of Germany in preparation for the selection will not make that preparation easy. Still it is possible to use the time between now and the elections profitably for some discreet approaches. Specially the idea prevails of starting talks with the Soviets Union between the time of the FRG elections and the Communist Party Congress. In the Italian opinion, this idea is rather optimistic and not so wise.
- 8. Fanfani got the definite impression that the Russians would substantially alter attitude if there were a declaration questioning the willingness to negotiate on the subject of the Polish and Czechoslovakian frontiers and willingness to provide guarantees against further German rearmament.
- 9. Fanfani definitely got the impression from Khrushchev that he would like to stabilize the situation in the West so that he could pay more attention to his problem with China.
- 10. Khrushchev stated that he wished for the return of John Foster Dulles. He said that Mr Kennedy's foreign policy provided a great problem for him.

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